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sellers’ incentives to fail to deliver securities are explicitly incorporated. In equilib-
rium, too many sellers choose to fail relative to the social optimum. Two types of
interventions are studied: a fails charge and an interest reset. These interventions
improve efficiency by lowering the fraction of sellers who fail and making it easier
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Repurchase agreements (repos) are one of the important sources of short-term funding
for major financial institutions (see Garbade et al. [10]). A repo is a promise by a seller
(denoted as “she”) to sell a security to a buyer (denoted as “he”) for an agreed price
on a purchase date (starting leg) and to repurchase the security from the buyer for a
different price on a repurchase date (closing leg), as illustrated in Figure 1. However,
even if the seller agrees to, she may strategically choose to fail to deliver the security on
a timely basis, which Fleming and Garbade [7] call a strategic fail. Because there was an
extraordinary volume of fails during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, novel interventions
were introduced to mitigate dysfunctionality in repo markets since then (see Garbade et
al. [10]). The purpose of this study is to analyze how these interventions reduce sellers’
incentives to fail and to characterize the optimal levels of such interventions.
An incentive for a strategic fail arises as follows. Through a repo, a seller pays a
buyer the difference between the repurchase price and the purchase price, called the
repo interest. The seller remains obliged to pay the full amount of the repo interest to
the buyer regardless of whether she delivers the promised security late or not at all, as
illustrated in Figure 2. This convention provides an incentive for the seller to deliver
the security on the scheduled starting date for a sufficiently high repo interest rate (see
Fleming and Garbade [8]). In the absence of any ancillary costs or penalties, the seller
has little incentive to deliver the security at a repo interest rate of zero. She may even
strictly prefer failing to lending money if the repo interest rate is negative (see Fleming
and Garbade [8]).
When the repo interest rate is so low, fails even become chronic (see Garbade et al.
[10]). When fails become chronic, a buyer who bought (but did not receive) a security
is nailed to a relationship with a failing seller, wherein he must bargain with the seller










Figure 1: The figure describes a repo when no fails occur. The seller sells a security for a purchase







Figure 2: The figure describes a fail at the starting leg. When the seller fails to deliver the security
at the starting leg, she is still obliged to pay the repo interest at the closing leg.
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becomes insolvent during this period and that, to replace the security, the buyer may
have to pay more than the original price negotiated with the insolvent seller. The fear
of failing to receive securities on a timely basis can harm market liquidity and function.
Thus, fails have been a matter of primary concern to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York for decades (see Garbade and Keane [11]).
Even since before the financial crisis, there have been instances wherein particular
securities have exhibited repo interest rates near zero and high volumes of fails. Such
examples include the squeeze in the 30-year Treasury bond in May 1986, the chronic fails
following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, and the chronic fails in the 10-year
Treasury note in June 2003 (see Garbade and Keane [11]). During the financial crisis,
primary dealer fails in Treasury securities rose sharply to an average of $379 billion
per day during the week of October 9, 2008, from an average of less than $10 billion
per day during the week of September 4, 2008 (see Garbade et al. [10]). Unlike earlier
episodes, fails during the crisis involved securities across the entire yield curve and other
classes of assets such as agency debt securities and agency mortgage-backed securities
(see Garbade and Keane [11]).
To mitigate sellers’ incentives to fail, two types of novel interventions have been
introduced since the financial crisis: a fails charge and an interest reset. The fails
charge has been implemented since May 1, 2009, by the Treasury Market Practices
Group for U.S. Treasury securities. It allows a buyer to claim monetary compensation
from a seller when the seller fails at the starting leg. Garbade et al. [10] document that
fails averaged about $14.4 billion per day during the first four months of 2009, but only
$4.2 billion per day after the implementation of the fails charge until July 2010. The
interest reset has been included as an optional supplementary condition in the Global
Master Repurchase Agreement since 2011. It requires the repo interest to be reset to
zero until the fail is cured, if a seller fails at the starting leg of a negative interest repo.
This is currently an optional condition, and applicable only for negative interest repos
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(see ICMA [17, 16]).
In this study, we construct a search theoretic model of repos wherein the sellers’
incentives to fail and the endogenous determination of the repo interest are both ex-
plicitly incorporated. In our baseline model, described in Section 2, the sellers’ benefits
from repos are stochastic and not known until the starting leg. Repos are assumed to
be incomplete contacts in the sense that future realization of the sellers’ benefits from
repos cannot be included in the terms of the repos. Agents cannot commit to delivery
of the collateral security. If sellers receive a low realization of the benefits from repos,
they choose to fail at the starting leg. In the equilibrium, too many sellers choose to
fail relative to the social optimum.
In this framework, we show that both the fails charge and interest reset attain
the socially optimal outcome. These interventions improve efficiency by lowering the
fraction of sellers failing at the starting leg and making it easier for buyers to find their
counterparties. We provide a complete characterization of the optimal interventions.
As is intuitive, the optimal fails charge equals the lost benefit of a failed buyer. The
optimal fails charge equals the lost benefit of a failed buyer. The optimal reset interest
is such that the lost benefit for a failed buyer equals the difference between the reset
interest and the original repo interest. The result for the optimal reset suggests that, in
the baseline environment, the zero reset for negative interest repos does not achieve the
social optimum.
We then explore three extensions of the framework in Section 5 wherein we incor-
porate some important aspects of reality. In the first extension, we study the case in
which agents take leveraged positions using trading opportunities outside the repo pair.
We show that the optimal fails charge becomes higher as the outside price falls faster
over time, while the optimal reset interest does not even depend on the outside prices.
In the second extension, we study the case wherein sellers default at the closing leg
with some probability. We show that the optimal reset interest becomes lower as sellers
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default with higher probability, while the result on the optimal fails charge depends
crucially on the repo interest.
In the third extension, we study the case wherein sellers are allowed to make late
delivery. We provide a rationale for the fact that, in reality, the fails charge is imposed
when a fail is cured. In the second (default) and third (late delivery) extensions, we
provide a rationale for the zero reset, which is in contrast to the result in the baseline
environment.
This study is particularly relevant to understand the extraordinary volume of fails
during the recent financial crisis as well as those in other episodes and the workings of
the novel interventions implemented recently. In various extensions that are relevant to
the existing literature outlined below, we show that the optimal fails charge and optimal
interest reset are differently affected by fundamental variables such as asset prices outside
a repo pair and the probability of sellers’ default. This implication emphasizes that,
when the interventions are implemented, a policymaker needs to carefully distinguish
between the two.
Related Literature. Repo markets have attracted growing attention, especially since
“run-on-repo” discussions on the global financial crisis. Using data from a high-quality
dealer in the bilateral repo market, Gorton and Metrick [12] argue that the crisis was
caused by a run on the repo market. Copeland, Martin, and Walker [4] show that repo
haircuts were surprisingly stable in the market for most other cash borrowers, although
there was a sharp decline in the tri-party repo funding of Lehman Brothers in September
2008. Using data from the tri-party repo market, Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov [19]
suggest that the run on repo backed by private-sector collateral was not central to the
collapse of short-term funding in aggregate. Gorton, Metrick, and Ross [13] note that
significant details of the run remain shrouded because many of the providers of repo
finance, especially those in the bilateral repo market, are unregulated cash pools.
This study fits in a body of literature that uses search theoretic models to describe
6
the repo markets; it is motivated by the fact that repo markets are over-the-counter
markets (see Choudhry [3]). Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen [6] show that repo premia
on particular securities (“repo specials”) are larger when inventories are larger and
interest-rate volatility is higher. Vayanos and Weill [26] explain why just-issued bonds
(“on-the-run”) trade at lower yields than previously issued bonds, when short positions
can be established in a repo market. Tomura [23] shows that a need for a repo arises
from an investor’s short investment horizon. Our model shares basic structures with
their models, such as search and bargaining frictions. Adding to the literature, our
study sheds light on the workings of interventions on fails by explicitly incorporating
sellers’ incentives to fail at the starting leg and the endogenous determination of the
repo interest.
Our first extension on leverage is related to the literature on leverage and re-use (also
referred to as “rehypothecation”) of collateral assets in the context of repo markets.
Park and Kahn [22] show that rehypothecation incurs deadweight cost by misallocat-
ing assets among agents when a cash borrower defaults. Bottazi, Luque, and Páscoa
[2] hint that default and fails have important consequences on rehypothecation. Our
leverage extension adds to the literature insights on how the optimal fail interventions
are characterized when agents are allowed to take leveraged positions.
In line with existing literature on default, we study a seller’s default in our sec-
ond extension. Gottardi, Maurin, and Monnet [14] emphasize that the punishment for
default may exceed the future market value of the collateral because of the recourse
nature of repos. Infante [15] emphasize that cash borrowers are directly exposed to
an intermediary dealer’s default because they risk losing their collateral. Valderrama
[25] shows how a liquidity shock to a cash lender propagates in the market even if the
cash lender remains solvent in all states of nature. Nuño and Thomas [21] explain the
observed fluctuations in intermediary leverage and real economic activity through the
lens of bank default risk, limited liability, and moral hazard. Donaldson and Micheler
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[5] show that a decrease in credit frictions cause an increase in systemic risk arising
from default in credit chains. We contribute to the literature by investigating how the
optimal fail interventions depend on the possibility of a seller’s default.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
define the baseline environment. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium with
no interventions and the social optimum in the baseline environment. In Section 4,
we characterize the optimal fails charge and the optimal reset interest in the baseline
environment. In Section 5, we study three extensions of the model. We provide the
details of the proofs in the Appendix.
2 Environment
There are three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. There is a continuum of buyers whose measure
is exogenously given. There is a continuum of potential sellers who can endogenously
enter the repo market by paying entry cost k > 0. The ratio of the measure of buyers to
that of sellers is denoted by θ. Each seller holds one unit of a security, which pays out
value v > 0 at the end of period 2. For simplicity, we assume that agents can hold at
most one unit of the security, following Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen [6]; Vayanos and
Weill [26]; Tomura [23]; and Infante [15] among others. “One unit” can be interpreted
as the unit that a buyer wants to trade and that a counterparty seller agrees to trade.
Each agent has a linear utility function. Each agent is assumed to have a sufficient
amount of cash to cover transactions.
In period 0, buyers and sellers are randomly matched into pairs. The probability of
a buyer finding a seller, denoted as ζ(θ), and that of a seller finding a buyer, denoted as
η(θ), depends on the buyer-to-seller ratio θ. The function ζ : R++ → [0, 1] is smooth and
strictly decreasing, and the function η : R++ → [0, 1] is smooth and strictly increasing.
Because the probability of finding a partner multiplied by the measure of a party must
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equal the measure of matched pairs, the two functions must satisfy η(θ) = θζ(θ). We
assume that limθ→0+ η(θ) = 0 and limθ→∞ η(θ) = 1. This is a generalized version of
a matching technology in Antinolfi et al. [1]. The pairwise-meeting structure here is
meant to capture the over-the-counter nature of the repo markets (see Choudhry [3]).
In period 0, each pair of a buyer and a seller determines the terms of a repurchase
agreement (or a repo). A repo consists of a sequence of transactions, as illustrated in
Figure 1. In period 1, which we call the starting leg, the buyer purchases the security
from the seller for price p1. In period 2, which we call the closing leg, the seller repur-
chases the security from the buyer for price p2 if the buyer purchased it in period 1.
Notice that they determine the purchase price and the repurchase price in period 0 (prior
to the starting leg). Following Trejos and Wright [24], we suppose that they split the
expected gains from a repo proportionally (à la Kalai [18]) with the buyer’s bargaining
power σ ∈ (0, 1). The difference between the repurchase price and the purchase price
(i.e., p2 − p1) is called the repo interest. The repo interest is normally expressed as a
percentage, called a repo rate, but the expression here is qualitatively equivalent.
If a buyer and a seller make a transaction at the starting leg, the buyer uses the
security and the seller uses cash at the end of period 1. If a buyer holds the security at
the end of period 1, he enjoys net benefit x. If a seller holds cash at the end of period
1, she enjoys net benefit ỹ, which is a random variable realized at the end of period 0.
We suppose that a repo is an incomplete contract in the sense that the realization of ỹ
cannot be included in the terms of a repo (see ICMA [16]). We assume that ỹ is an i.i.d.
uniform random variable on [yl, yh] across different sellers. This can be thought of as a
version of the assumption in Vayanos and Weill [26] that the motive for an asset sale is
some idiosyncratic shock. The net benefits x and ỹ can be interpreted as benefits such
as supplying their clients with the security, covering leveraged positions, and hedging
derivatives (see ICMA [17]).
We suppose that agents cannot commit to whether they deliver the security or cash.
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Following the market practice, we suppose that, when an agent fails to deliver the
security or cash, the seller must pay the repo interest to the buyer. Most importantly,
when a seller fails to deliver the security at the starting leg, she remains obliged to pay
the repo interest, as illustrated in Figure 2 (see Fleming and Garbade [8]). In other
words, by paying the repo interest, the seller must compensate the buyer for not being
able to use the security at the end of period 1.
Our main focus is what Garbade et al. [10] call strategic fails, wherein sellers inten-
tionally fail to deliver the security. Although there are other reasons for failing, such as
miscommunication and operational problems (see ICMA [17]), we do not model them
explicitly. In practice, fails are not unusual and are generally not viewed as events of
contractual default, as Fleming and Garbade [9] document. When a fail occurs, repo
participants usually choose to negotiate a solution before declaring a default because it
is very costly to put a cash borrower into default; it is also considered to be the last
resort (see ICMA [17]). Because we are interested in sellers’ incentives to fail, we leave
our analysis of default to Section 5.2.
Throughout the study, we make the following assumptions about parameters.
Assumption 1. (i) x > 0, (ii) yh > 0 > yl, (iii) yh + yl > 0, and (iv) −x > yl.
Intuitively, the implications of these assumptions are as follows: (i) guarantees that,
in equilibrium, each buyer has an incentive to deliver cash at the starting leg. This
allows us to focus on the incentives of the seller side. (ii) implies that, in equilibrium,
some sellers choose to fail to deliver the security at the starting leg. This makes our
analysis about the sellers’ incentives to fail non-trivial. (iii) implies that sellers derive
positive expected gains from a repo. This guarantees a positive measure of potential
sellers to enter the repo market in equilibrium. (iv) guarantees that an efficient outcome
is physically feasible under the optimal interventions. Even without this assumption,
some level of interventions is socially beneficial, although the efficient outcome cannot
be attained.
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3 Equilibrium and Optimum
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium with no interventions and the social
optimum. We show that the equilibrium with no interventions is inefficient because too
many sellers fail at the starting leg relative to the social optimum.
3.1 Equilibrium
We write down the equilibrium conditions under no interventions.
Consider the incentives at the closing leg. If a buyer delivers the security at the
closing leg, he receives an amount p2 of cash. If he fails to deliver the security at the
closing leg, he receives the repo interest p2 − p1 and obtains a monetary value v from
the security. Hence, the buyer has an incentive to deliver the security at the closing leg
if and only if
p2 ≥ p2 − p1 + v. (1)
If a seller delivers cash at the closing leg, she pays an amount p2 of cash and obtains
a monetary value v from the security. If she fails to deliver cash at the closing leg, she
pays the repo interest p2 − p1. Hence, the seller has an incentive to deliver cash at the
closing leg if and only if
−p2 + v ≥ −(p2 − p1). (2)
Consider the incentives at the starting leg, given that the incentives at the closing leg
are satisfied. If a buyer delivers cash at the starting leg, he pays p1 at the starting leg,
obtains a net benefit x, and receives p2 at the closing leg. If he chooses not to purchase
the security at the starting leg, he receives the repo interest p2 − p1 at the closing leg.
Hence, the buyer has an incentive to deliver cash at the starting leg if and only if
−p1 + x+ p2 ≥ p2 − p1. (3)
If a seller delivers the security at the starting leg, she receives p1 at the starting leg,
obtains a realized value y of the random net benefit ỹ, and pays p2 at the closing leg. If
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she chooses not to sell the security, she pays the repo interest p2 − p1 at the closing leg
and obtains a monetary value v from the security. Hence, the seller has an incentive to
deliver the security at the starting leg if and only if
p1 + y − p2 + v ≥ −(p2 − p1) + v. (4)
In period 0, a buyer–seller pair determines the repurchase price p2 by proportional
bargaining. The buyer takes a fraction σ ∈ (0, 1) of net expected gains from a repo and
the seller takes the remaining fraction 1− σ.
Let ȳ be the cutoff value of y that satisfies (4) with equality. It is clear that ȳ is a
key variable to measure efficiency and is zero in the equilibrium with no interventions.
Let µh := Prob(ỹ ≥ ȳ) (resp. µl = 1 − µh) be the probability of sellers not failing
(resp. sellers failing) at the starting leg. Let ỹe := E[ỹ|ỹ ≥ ȳ] be the expectation
of ỹ conditional on the event that sellers deliver the security at the starting leg. Let
π := µh(x+ ỹ
e) be the expected gains from a repo.
If the seller delivers the security at the starting leg, the buyer obtains −p1 + x+ p2.
If the seller fails to deliver the security at the starting leg, the buyer obtains p2 − p1.
Hence, the buyer’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(−p1 + x+ p2) + µl(p2 − p1) = σπ. (5)
If the seller delivers the security at the starting leg, the seller obtains p1+ ỹ
e−p2+v.
If the seller fails to deliver the security at the starting leg, the seller obtains−(p2−p1)+v.
The seller’s outside option is v. Hence, the seller’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(p1 + ỹ
e − p2 + v) + µl(−p2 + p1 + v)− v = (1− σ)π. (6)
There is a continuum of potential sellers who can enter the repo market by paying
the entry cost. If a seller finds a buyer, she obtains µh(p1+ ỹ
e−p2+v)+µl(−p2+p1+v).
If a seller does not find a buyer, she obtains v. Because the sellers’ net gains from entry
must equal zero, we obtain
η(θ) [µh(p1 + ỹ
e − p2 + v) + µl(−p2 + p1 + v)] + [1− η(θ)] v − v = k. (7)
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Definition 1. An equilibrium is a tuple (p1, p2, θ, ȳ) that satisfies (1-7).
Proposition 1. An equilibrium exists if and only if the expected gains from a repo to
the seller are larger than the cost of entry, that is,
k < (1− σ)π. (8)
When there are no interventions, we obtain ȳ = 0. In this case, the expected gains















The right-hand side of (9) is less than 1 if and only if (8) holds.
3.2 Social Optimum
When (7) is satisfied, the sellers’ net expected gains from entry are zero. Hence, the
social welfare, denoted as W , simply equals the buyers’ expected gains, that is,
W = ζ(θ) [µh(−p1 + x+ p2) + µl(−p1 + p2)] . (10)
Definition 2. The social optimum is a tuple (p1, p2, θ, ȳ) that maximize W subject to
(5-7).
That is, the social optimum is what is socially optimal subject to the search friction,
bargaining friction, and entry cost, but not the incentive constraints of the agents. The
following proposition summarizes the social optimum.
Proposition 2. At the social optimum, (i) the expected gains from a repo are maximized,
(ii) the buyer-to-seller ratio is minimized, and (iii) the fraction of sellers failing to deliver
the security at the starting leg is lower than in the equilibrium with no interventions.
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Proof. To prove the proposition, we write the social welfare in terms of ȳ. Substituting








The only endogenous variable in this expression is the buyer-to-seller ratio θ. The
social welfare is maximized when θ is minimized. From (9), θ is minimized when π is
maximized.










Let ȳ∗ be the value of ȳ at the social optimum. From (11), we obtain ȳ∗ = −x < 0.
This implies that ȳ is higher in the equilibrium with no interventions than at the social
optimum. The fraction µl of sellers failing at the starting leg depends positively on
ȳ.
We show in Section 4 that optimal interventions attain ȳ = −x in the equilibrium.
In other words, they attain the highest expected gains π from a repo. Hence, from
Proposition 1, the equilibrium with an optimal intervention exists if the equilibrium
with no interventions exists.
4 Policy Analysis
In this section, we study two interventions: a fails charge and an interest reset. This
study sheds light on the workings of these interventions in the model in which the
sellers’ incentives to fail and the endogenous determination of the repo interest are both
explicitly considered. We show that the social optimum is attained in the equilibrium
with the optimal interventions. We provide complete characterizations of both the
optimal fails charge and the optimal reset interest.
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4.1 Fails Charge
The Treasury Market Practices Group introduced a fails charge for U.S. Treasuries on
May 1, 2009. Garbade et al [10] argue that the fails charge is important for two reasons.
First, it mitigates an important dysfunctionality in the repo market of significance to
the Federal Reserve in its execution of monetary policy. Second, it exemplifies the value
of cooperation between the public and private sectors in responding to altered market
conditions.
Motivated by this intervention, we suppose that a seller is required to pay a compen-
sation charge, denoted as c > 0, to a buyer when the seller fails to deliver the security at
the starting leg. Hence, the buyer obtains p2−p1+c and the seller obtains −(p2−p1)−c.
We do not impose a penalty on any other deviation from a repo. This is without loss
of generality because ȳ is solely determined by the seller’s incentive at the starting leg.
Let c∗ be the optimal fails charge. It is characterized as follows.
Proposition 3. The optimal fails charge equals the lost benefit for a failed buyer, that
is,
c∗ = x.
The essential part of the proof is to realize that the seller’s incentive (4) to deliver
the security at the starting leg is changed as
p1 + y − p2 + v ≥ −(p2 − p1) + v − c.
Hence, the cutoff value for the seller between failing and not failing at the starting leg
is
ȳ = −c.
All the other incentives (1-3) remain unchanged. As in Section 3.2, we obtain ȳ∗ = −x
at the social optimum. Hence, the optimal fails charge is c∗ = x.
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4.2 Interest Reset
The International Capital Market Association has recommended that, when a seller fails
to deliver a security at the starting leg of a negative interest repo, the repo interest is au-
tomatically reset to zero until the fail is cured. This recommendation has been included
as an optional supplementary condition in the Global Master Repurchase Agreement
since 2011 (see ICMA [17, 16]).
Motivated by this intervention, we assume that, if a seller fails to deliver the security
at the starting leg, the repo interest is forced to be reset to a certain level, denoted as
r ∈ R. Hence, the buyer obtains r and the seller obtains −r. Notice that in reality, this
interest reset is only applicable for negative interest repos, when both the buyer and the
seller agree to sign, and the reset interest is always zero. To characterize the optimal
reset interest, we do not restrict our attention to the zero reset.
The optimal reset interest is characterized as follows. Let r∗ be the optimal reset
interest and (p2 − p1)
∗ be the repo interest at the social optimum.
Proposition 4. The optimal reset interest is such that the lost benefit for a failed buyer
is compensated by the difference between the reset interest and the original repo interest,
that is,
x = r∗ − (p2 − p1)
∗. (12)
Let π∗ be the expected gains from a repo at the social optimum. Then, (12) is
equivalent to the optimal reset interest being equal to the expected gains from a repo
to a buyer, that is,
r∗ = σπ∗,
which is always positive. This implies that, although it is in a right direction, the zero
reset (i.e., r = 0), recommended by ICMA [17] particularly for negative interest repos,
does not achieve the social optimum in the baseline environment. This conclusion is
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overturned when we introduce sellers’ default in Section 5.2 or late delivery in Section
5.3. These extensions provide a rationale for the zero reset recommendation.
The essential part of the proof is to realize that the seller’s incentive (4) to deliver
the security at the starting leg is changed as
p1 + y − p2 + v ≥ −r + v.
Hence, the cutoff value for the seller between failing and not failing is
ȳ = p2 − p1 − r.
All the other incentives (1-3) remain unchanged. As in Section 3.2, we obtain ȳ∗ = −x
at the social optimum. Hence, the optimal reset interest satisfies (12).
5 Extensions
In this section, we study several extensions of the baseline environment, in which some
important aspects of reality, such as leverage, default, and late delivery, are incorpo-
rated. As is outlined in the Introduction, these aspects have been extensively studied
in existing models, but for different purposes. This study identifies how the optimal
interventions are affected in different manners by fundamental variables introduced in
these extensions.
In Subsection 5.1, we suppose that agents take leveraged positions using trading
opportunities outside the repo pair. We show that the optimal fails charge becomes
higher as the outside price falls faster over time, while the optimal reset interest does
not even depend on the outside prices. In Subsection 5.2, we suppose that sellers
default at the closing leg with some probability. We show that the optimal reset interest
becomes lower as sellers default with higher probability, while the result on the optimal
fails charge depends crucially on the repo interest. In Subsection 5.3, we suppose that
there exists a middle leg at which sellers failing at the starting leg can still make late
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delivery. We provide a rationale for the fact that, in reality, the fails charge is imposed
when a fail is cured. In the second (default) and third (late delivery) extensions, we
provide a rationale for the zero interest reset, which stands in contrast to Proposition 4.
5.1 Leveraged Positions
In a repo, one party can borrow cash to finance a long position in a security, and the
counterparty can borrow the security to establish a short position (see ICMA [17]). Some
studies emphasize the importance of short selling as, for example, a source of increased
liquidity in the market (see Vayanos and Weill [26]). The purpose of this extension is to
study how leveraged transactions affect the terms of repos and the optimal interventions.
We suppose that sellers are not endowed with a unit of the security, unlike in the
baseline environment. Other than participation in the repo market, both buyers and
sellers face some outside trading opportunities. In period 1, each seller (resp. buyer)
has an opportunity to buy the security from (resp. sell the security to) an outside
opportunity for price p̂1. In period 2, each seller (resp. buyer) has an opportunity
to sell the security to (resp. buy the security from) an outside opportunity for price
p̂2. Implicitly, we suppose that both buyers and sellers want only to take leveraged
positions. In other words, we focus on their incentives to participate in both the repo
market and the outside opportunity simultaneously, but not in only one of them. We
suppose that the outside prices p̂1 and p̂2 are exogenously given and deterministic. We
do not explicitly model the pricing mechanism in the outside trading opportunities. We
reinterpret x and ỹ as net benefits from taking leveraged positions. These benefits do
not include capital gains from outside price changes. For example, a buyer wants to buy
it in the repo market in order to supply his client with the security. The environment
is otherwise the same as in Section 2.
The difference between the current market value of an asset and the purchase price
of the asset in a repo is called a haircut. In this environment, the haircut is defined as
18
p̂1 − p1. The equilibrium with no interventions is characterized as follows.
Proposition 5. Suppose that agents are allowed to take leveraged positions. Then, as
the outside price falls faster over time, (i) more sellers fail at the starting leg, (ii) the
haircut becomes higher, and (iii) the social welfare becomes lower.
To understand the proposition, consider a seller’s incentive at the starting leg. If the
seller purchases the security from the outside opportunity and sells it at the starting leg
of a repo, she obtains p1 − p̂1. This is the construction of a leveraged long position. If
the seller repurchases the security at the closing leg of a repo and sells it to the outside
opportunity, she obtains p̂2 − p2. This is the settlement of the leveraged long position.
The seller has an incentive to construct a leveraged long position at the starting leg if
and only if
p1 − p̂1 + y − p2 + p̂2 ≥ −(p2 − p1).
Hence, the cutoff value for the seller between failing and not failing at the starting leg
is
ȳ = −(p̂2 − p̂1). (13)
This implies that, as p̂1 − p̂2 becomes higher, more sellers fail at the starting leg.
The buyer has an incentive to construct a short-selling position at the starting leg if
and only if
−p1 + p̂1 + x+ p2 − p̂2 ≥ p2 − p1.
Hence, we obtain x ≥ p̂2 − p̂1. From (13), we obtain ȳ ≥ −x. We can show that, as in
the baseline environment, we obtain ȳ∗ = −x at the social optimum. Hence, it is always
the case that ȳ ≥ ȳ∗. This implies that, as p̂1 − p̂2 becomes higher, the social welfare
only becomes lower.
From agents’ incentives at the closing leg, the haircut in the equilibrium is p̂1 − p̂2.
Hence, as p̂1− p̂2 becomes higher, the haircut becomes higher. Similar results about the
haircut are obtained in, for example, Gottardi, Maurin, and Monnet [14]; Infante [15];
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and Park and Kahn [22]. In this environment, although the haircut is bounded from
below because p̂1 − p̂2 ≥ −x, it can be negative if p̂2 > p̂1. In reality, there are always
non-negative haircuts in repo markets. This is partly because we do not consider the
potential loss of the collateral value owing to such factors as price volatility and the cost
of liquidating the collateral asset.
5.1.1 Fails Charge
In this environment, the optimal fails charge is characterized as follows.
Proposition 6. Suppose that agents are allowed to take leveraged positions. Then, the
optimal fails charge is c∗ = x− (p̂2− p̂1). As the outside price falls faster over time, the
optimal fails charge becomes higher.
With a fails charge, we obtain ȳ = −(p̂2 − p̂1)− c. Hence, the optimal fails charge is
c∗ = x − (p̂2 − p̂1). That is, the optimal fails charge equals the lost benefit for a failed
buyer. In this environment, the lost benefit for a failed buyer is not only x, but also
the capital gain from the outside price fall, that is, p̂1 − p̂2. The intuition is simple. As
the outside price falls faster, more sellers fail at the starting leg. Hence, a higher fails
charge should be imposed to prevent too many sellers from failing.
5.1.2 Interest Reset
In this environment, the optimal reset interest is characterized as follows.
Proposition 7. Suppose that agents are allowed to take leveraged positions. Then, the
optimal reset interest is such that x − (p̂2 − p̂1) = r
∗ − (p2 − p1)
∗. The optimal reset
interest does not depend on the outside prices.
With the interest reset, we obtain ȳ = p2 − p1 − r − (p̂2 − p̂1). Hence, the optimal
reset interest is such that x − (p̂2 − p̂1) = r
∗ − (p2 − p1)
∗. This is equivalent to saying
that, just as in the baseline environment, the optimal reset interest equals the expected
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gains from a repo to a buyer, that is, r∗ = σπ∗. This implies that, unlike the optimal
fails charge, the optimal reset interest does not depend on the outside prices. This is
because the repo rate reacts perfectly as the outside price changes over time. Indeed,
the buyer’s proportional bargaining implies that
p2 − p1 = p̂2 − p̂1 +
1
µh
(σπ − µhx− µlr). (14)
In other words, if the outside price falls over time, the repo interest falls by exactly the
same amount.
Of course, the implication above is overemphasized to the extent that we assume that
all agents take leveraged positions. In the baseline environment, the buyer’s proportional
bargaining implies that
p2 − p1 =
1
µh
(σπ − µhx). (15)
Hence, if there is an idiosyncratic shock to a buyer prior to the starting leg whose
realization determines whether he needs to take a leveraged position (as in this section)
or he simply has sufficiently large cash holdings (as in the baseline environment), then
the repo interest is a convex combination between (14), which perfectly reacts to the
outside prices, and (15), which is independent of the outside prices.
5.2 Sellers’ Default
Placing a counterparty into default is a serious step, which has significant market im-
plications (see ICMA [17]). For example, Donaldson and Micheler [5] emphasize the
importance of default as a source of systemic risk. The purpose of this extension is to
study how the possibility of sellers’ exogenous default affects sellers’ strategic fails.
We suppose that sellers who undertake the transaction at the starting leg invest the
cash in a risky investment opportunity. The return of the investment opportunity is
realized at the end of period 1. With an exogenous probability α ∈ (0, 1), the return is
so small that sellers can pay neither the repurchase price nor the repo interest. In other
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words, sellers default at the closing leg with probability α. If a seller defaults, she incurs
the cost of default, denoted as γ > 0. Gottardi et at. [14] make a similar assumption
for the recourse nature of repos. The environment is otherwise the same as in Section
2.
The following Proposition summarizes the effects of default.
Proposition 8. Suppose that sellers default at the closing leg with probability α, which
is sufficiently close to zero. Then, as sellers default with higher probability, more sellers
fail at the starting leg and the social welfare becomes lower if the cost of default is larger
than the repo interest, that is,
γ > lim
α→0
(p2 − p1). (16)
To understand the proposition, consider a seller’s incentive to deliver the security at
the starting leg. If the seller does not default, she obtains p1 + y − p2 + v. If the seller
defaults, she obtains p1+y−γ. Hence, the seller has an incentive to deliver the security
at the starting leg if and only if
(1− α)(p1 + y − p2 + v) + α(p1 + y − γ) ≥ −(p2 − p1) + v.
Hence, the cutoff value for the seller between failing and not failing at the starting leg
is
ȳ = −α(p2 − p1) + αγ. (17)
Although the repo interest depends on α, we can show that if α is sufficiently close to
zero and if (16) holds, ȳ is strictly increasing in α.
In this environment, the expected gains from a repo are given by
π = µh(x+ ỹ
e − αγ). (18)
When α rises, the expected gains from a repo decrease because of the αγ term in (18).
This is a direct effect of default on social welfare. In addition, as α becomes higher,
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more sellers fail at the starting leg because of (17). This is an indirect effect of default
on social welfare.
From (18), we obtain ȳ∗ = −x + αγ at the social optimum. In other words, ȳ∗ is
strictly increasing in α. This is because, as sellers default with higher probability, it
becomes less profitable for them to enter the repo market. If we did not tolerate sellers
failing at the starting leg to some extent, there would be too few sellers in the repo
market. This would harm buyers by reducing the probability of them finding a repo
seller to trade with.
Both ȳ and ȳ∗ are strictly increasing in α. Hence, it is not so obvious whether the
equilibrium gets further away from the social optimum, as sellers default with higher
probability. We can show that this is indeed the case.
Unlike in the baseline environment, (17) shows that there exists a negative relation-
ship between the repo interest and the fraction of sellers failing at the starting leg. This
explains the mechanism of failure by sellers better because, in reality, it is known that
the number of fails by sellers tends to increase when the repo interest falls (see Fleming
and Garbade [7]).
5.2.1 Fails Charge
In this environment, the optimal fails charge is characterized as follows.
Proposition 9. Suppose that sellers default at the closing leg with probability α, which is
sufficiently close to zero. Then, the optimal fails charge is such that c∗ = x−α(p2−p1)
∗.
The optimal fails charge becomes lower as sellers default with higher probability if and
only if the repo interest is positive, that is, limα→0(p2 − p1)
∗ > 0.
With a fails charge, we obtain ȳ = −α(p2 − p1) + αγ − c. Hence, the optimal fails
charge is such that c∗ = x− α(p2 − p1)
∗. The lost benefit for a failed buyer is not only
x, but also the repo interest that the failing seller cannot pay because of her default.
Hence, unlike in the baseline environment, the optimal fails charge depends on the repo
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interest. In this way, whether the optimal fails charge is increasing or decreasing in α
crucially depends on the repo interest.
5.2.2 Interest Reset
In this environment, the optimal reset interest is characterized as follows.
Proposition 10. Suppose that sellers default at the closing leg with probability α, which
is sufficiently close to zero. Then, the optimal reset interest is such that x = r∗ − (1−
α)(p2−p1)
∗+αγ. The optimal reset interest becomes lower as sellers default with higher
probability.
With interest reset, we obtain
ȳ = (1− α)(p2 − p1)− r. (19)
Hence, the optimal reset interest is such that x = r∗ − (1−α)(p2 − p1)
∗ +αγ. Equation
(19) shows that there exists a positive relationship between the repo interest and the
fraction of sellers failing at the starting leg. This effect is not expected to be too large




be the probability of sellers not failing at the social optimum. The optimal
reset interest is strictly decreasing in α. In particular, a positive reset interest is socially
optimal if and only if the expected gains from a repo to a buyer are larger than the




The zero reset interest is socially optimal when the expected gains from a repo equal
the expected cost of default. This extension rationalizes the zero reset interest when
sellers default with sufficiently high probability.
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5.3 Late Delivery
When a seller fails to deliver a security at the starting leg, the repo remains in force
unless the buyer decides to terminate it. Hence, it is possible that the seller makes late
delivery between the original purchase date and the repurchase date (see ICMA [17]).
The purpose of this extension is to study circumstances in which a seller does not deliver
the security on time but may deliver the security any time between the original purchase
date and the repurchase date.
We suppose that there are four periods: t = 0, 1, 2, 3. In period 0, a buyer and
a seller sign a repo contract wherein the promised purchase date is period 1 and the
repurchase date is period 3. We call period 1 the starting leg, period 2 the middle leg,
and period 3 the closing leg. The buyer buys the security from the seller at the starting
leg for price p1. If the seller fails to deliver the security at the starting leg, no transaction
takes place, but the seller can still deliver the security at the middle leg. Following the
market practice, we suppose that the purchase price at the middle leg is still p1.
At the end of period 1, the buyer enjoys net benefit x1 > 0 from holding the security
and the seller enjoys net benefit ỹ1 from holding cash. We assume that ỹ1 is an i.i.d.
uniform random variable on [yl, yh] across different sellers. At the end of period 2, the
buyer enjoys net benefit x2 > 0 from holding the security and the seller enjoys net
benefit y2 > 0 from holding cash. We assume that y2 is deterministic. The environment
is otherwise the same as in Section 2.
Importantly, even if the seller does not deliver the security on time at the starting
leg, there is still a possibility that a buyer can benefit from receiving the security late at
the middle leg. Our main focus is to study whether a seller delivers the security on time
at the starting leg or she delivers the security late at the middle leg. The repo interest
is defined as p3 − p1.
The assumption that y2 is positive guarantees that, in the equilibrium, the sellers
who fail to deliver the security at the starting leg choose to deliver late at the middle
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leg. This allows us to focus on sellers’ fails at the starting leg. The equilibrium with no
interventions and the social optimum is characterized as follows.
Proposition 11. Suppose that sellers are allowed to make late delivery. Then, the frac-
tion of sellers failing at the starting leg is higher in the equilibrium with no interventions
than at the social optimum by the lost benefit for a failed buyer from late delivery.
To observe this, consider a seller’s incentive to deliver the security at the starting
leg. When she does not deliver the security at the starting leg, she has two options. If
she delivers the security at the middle leg, she obtains p1 + y2 − p3 + v. If she does not
deliver the security until the closing leg, she obtains −(p3 − p1) + v. Hence, the seller
has an incentive to deliver the security at the starting leg if and only if
p1 + y1 + y2 − p3 + v ≥ max{p1 + y2 − p3 + v,−(p3 − p1) + v}. (20)
Let ȳ1 be the cutoff value that satisfies (20) with equality and ȳ
∗
1 be part of the social
optimum. Because we assume y2 > 0, the seller prefers late delivery to a fail at the
middle leg, that is, p1+y2−p3+v > −(p3−p1)+v. Hence, we obtain ȳ1 = 0 from (20).
Meanwhile, we obtain ȳ∗1 = −x1 at the social optimum, because the expected gains from









+ x2 + y2.
We study the optimal interventions. In this environment, sellers do not have an
incentive to fail at the middle leg without any penalty. Hence, the penalty on fails at
the middle leg (i.e., no delivery at all) can be anything as long as it is larger than or
equal to the penalty on fails at the starting leg (i.e., late delivery at the middle leg).
Without loss of generality, we impose the same penalty on fails at the middle leg as that
on fails at the starting leg. Let c be the fails charge at the starting leg and r be the
reset interest at the starting leg.
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5.3.1 Fails Charge
In this environment, the optimal fails charge is characterized as follows.
Proposition 12. Suppose that sellers are allowed to make late delivery. Then, the
optimal fails charge equals the lost benefit for a failed buyer from late delivery, that is,
c∗ = x1.
With a fails charge, we obtain ȳ1 = −c. Hence, the optimal fails charge is c
∗ = x1. It
is important to note that c∗ 6= x1 + x2. An important implication of this finding is that
the optimal fails charge depends on the duration of a fail. In reality, the fails charge is
imposed when a fail is cured, not when a fail occurs. The proposition rationalizes this
fact.
5.3.2 Repo Interest Reset
In this environment, the optimal reset interest is characterized as follows.
Proposition 13. Suppose that sellers are allowed to make late delivery. Then, the
optimal reset interest is such that the lost benefit for a failed buyer from late delivery is
compensated by the difference between the reset interest and the original repo interest,
that is, x1 = r
∗ − (p3 − p1)
∗.
With interest reset, we obtain ȳ1 = p3 − p1 − r. Hence, the optimal reset interest
is such that x1 = r
∗ − (p3 − p1)
∗. This is equivalent to the optimal reset interest being
equal to the expected gains from a repo to a buyer minus the net benefit to the buyer
from late delivery, that is,
r∗ = σπ∗ − x2.
Unlike in the baseline environment, the optimal reset interest can be negative if, for
example, the bargaining power σ of the buyer is sufficiently close to zero and the net
benefit x2 from late delivery for the buyer is sufficiently large.
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6 Conclusions
We develop a search theoretic model of repos wherein the sellers’ incentives to strate-
gically fail and the endogenous determination of the repo interest are both explicitly
incorporated. In the framework, we study two types of interventions: a fails charge
and an interest reset. We show that if they are implemented at the optimal level, both
interventions achieve the efficient outcome. These interventions improve efficiency by
lowering the fraction of sellers failing at the starting leg and making it easier for buy-
ers to find their counterparties. We provide a complete characterization of the optimal
interventions. The optimal fails charge equals the lost benefit for a failed buyer. The
optimal reset interest is such that the lost benefit for a failed buyer equals the difference
between the reset interest and the original repo interest. The result for the optimal
reset suggests that the zero reset for negative interest repos does not achieve the social
optimum in the baseline environment.
In three extensions, we study leveraged transactions, sellers’ default, and late de-
livery. The results suggest that the nature of the optimal fails charge and that of the
optimal interest reset are very different. In the first (leverage) extension, we show that
the optimal fails charge becomes higher as the outside price falls faster over time, while
the optimal reset interest does not even depend on the outside prices. In the second (de-
fault) extension, the optimal reset interest becomes lower as sellers default with higher
probability, while the result on the optimal fails charge depends crucially on the repo
interest. In the third (late delivery) extension, we provide a rationale for the fact that,
in reality, the fails charge is imposed when a fail is cured. In the second and third
extensions, we provide a rationale for the zero reset under some parameter conditions,
which is in contrast to the result obtained in the baseline environment.
This study is particularly relevant to understand the extraordinary volume of fails
during the recent financial crisis as well as those in other episodes and the workings
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of the novel interventions implemented recently. In various setups that are relevant to
the existing literature, we show that the optimal fails charge and the optimal interest
reset are affected in very different manners by fundamental variables such as asset prices
outside a repo pair and the probability of sellers’ default. This emphasizes that, when the
interventions are implemented, a policymaker needs to carefully distinguish between the
two. In this study, we focus on the microstructure of the repo market. The importance
of the sellers’ incentives to fail and their implications on the optimal interventions under
various setups leave an open question. How would dysfunctionality in the repo markets
arising from strategic fails propagate to other markets, in particular, to the real sectors
or the entire economy? Such investigation would be an interesting direction for future
research and would call for a more macroeconomic-oriented model with a flavor of the
methodology developed here.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. The buyer’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(−p1 + x+ p2) + µl(−p1 + p2 + c) = σπ.
The seller’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(p1 + y − p2 + v) + µl(p1 − p2 − c)− v = (1− σ)π.
The zero profit condition for sellers is given by
η(θ) [µh(p1 + y − p2 + v) + µl(p1 − p2 − c)] + [1− η(θ)] v − v = k.
The social welfare is given by
W = ζ(θ) [µh(−p1 + x+ p2) + µl(−p1 + p2 + c)] .
In the same way as we obtain the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the same expres-









This implies that we obtain ȳ∗ = −x at the social optimum. Because we obtain ȳ = −c,
the optimal fails charge is c∗ = x.
Proof of Proposition 4. The buyer’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(−p1 + x+ p2) + µlr = σπ.
The seller’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(p1 + y − p2 + v) + µl(−r)− v = (1− σ)π.
The zero profit condition of sellers is given by
η(θ) [µh(p1 + y − p2 + v) + µl(−r)] + [1− η(θ)] v − v = k.
The social welfare is given by
W = ζ(θ) [µh(−p1 + x+ p2) + µlr] .
In the same way as we obtain the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the same ex-
pressions as (9), (11), and (21). This implies that we obtain ȳ∗ = −x at the so-
cial optimum. Because we obtain ȳ = p2 − p1 − r, the optimal reset interest satisfies
x = r∗ − (p2 − p1)
∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof has two parts: In Part 1, we show that p1 = p̂2. In
Part 2, we show that ȳ∗ = −x at the social optimum.
Part 1. We show that p1 = p̂2. We consider incentives at the closing leg. The buyer
has an incentive to purchase the security from the outside opportunity and sell it at the
closing leg of a repo if and only if
p2 − p̂2 ≥ p2 − p1.
The seller has an incentive to purchase the security at the closing leg of a repo and sell
it to the outside opportunity if and only if
−p2 + p̂2 ≥ −(p2 − p1).
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They together imply that p1 = p̂2.
Part 2. We show that ȳ∗ = −x at the social optimum. The buyer’s proportional
bargaining is given by
µh(−p1 + p̂1 + x+ p2 − p̂2) + µl(p2 − p1) = σπ.
The seller’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(p1 − p̂1 + ỹ
e − p2 + p̂2) + µl(p1 − p2) = (1− σ)π.
The zero profit condition of sellers is given by
η(θ) [µh(p1 − p̂1 + ỹ
e − p2 + p̂2) + µl(p1 − p2)] = k.
The social welfare is given by
W = ζ(θ) [µh(−p1 + p̂1 + x+ p2 − p̂2) + µl(p2 − p1)] .
In the same way that we obtain the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the same
expressions as (9), (11), and (21). This implies that we obtain ȳ∗ = −x at the social
optimum.
Proof of Proposition 6. We derive only the cutoff ȳ. The seller has an incentive to
purchase the security from the outside opportunity and sell it at the starting leg of a
repo if and only if
p1 − p̂1 + y − p2 + p̂2 ≥ −(p2 − p1)− c.
From this, we obtain
ȳ = −(p̂2 − p̂1)− c,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. We derive only the cutoff ȳ. The seller has an incentive to
purchase the security from the outside opportunity and sell it at the starting leg of a
repo if and only if
p1 − p̂1 + y − p2 + p̂2 ≥ −r.
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From this, we obtain
ȳ = p2 − p1 − r − (p̂2 − p̂1),
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof has three parts. In Part 1, we derive the same
expression as (9) and (21), except that π has a different expression. This implies that
social welfare is strictly decreasing in α if π is strictly decreasing in α. In Part 2, we
show that π is strictly decreasing in α if ȳ is strictly increasing in α. In Part 3, we show
that ȳ is strictly increasing in α.
Part 1. We write down the equilibrium conditions for this environment. The incen-
tive constrains at the closing leg are the same as (1) and (2). The buyer has an incentive
to deliver cash at the starting leg if and only if
(1− α)(−p1 + x+ p2) + α(−p1 + x+ v) ≥ p2 − p1.
The cutoff value for the seller between failing and not failing at the starting leg is given
by (17).
The expected gains π from a repo are given by (18). The buyer’s proportional
bargaining is given by
µh {(1− α)(−p1 + x+ p2) + α(−p1 + x+ v)}+ µl(p2 − p1) = σπ. (22)
The seller’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh {(1− α)(p1 + ỹ
e − p2 + v) + α(p1 + ỹ
e − γ)}+ µl(v − p2 + p1)− v
= (1− σ)π.
The zero profit condition of sellers is given by
η(θ) [µh {(1− α)(p1 + ỹ
e − p2 + v) + α(p1 + ỹ
e − γ)}+ µl(v − p2 + p1)]
+[1− η(θ)]v − v = k.
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The social welfare is given by
W = ζ(θ) [µh {(1− α)(−p1 + x+ p2) + α(−p1 + x+ v)}+ µl(p2 − p1)] .
In the same way that we obtain the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the same
expressions as (9) and (21).
Part 2. We show that π is strictly decreasing in α. We suppose that α is sufficiently
















which implies that π is strictly decreasing in α if ȳ is strictly increasing in α.
Part 3. We show that ȳ is strictly increasing in α. From (22), we obtain
p2 − p1 =
1
1− α
(σπ − µhx− σαγ).













− (1− σ)x− σαγ
}
= 0. (23)
Define a function F by













− (1− σ)x− σαγ
}
.
Equation (23) is equivalent to F (ȳ, α) = 0.
To show that ȳ is strictly increasing in α, we show that (i) F is strictly increasing





(ŷ, α) = 1,





(ȳ, α) = −γ + lim
α→0
(p2 − p1) < 0,
which implies that F is strictly decreasing in α at ŷ = ȳ. Hence, ȳ is strictly increasing
in α.
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Proof of Proposition 9. We show that the optimal fails charge is strictly decreasing in
α if and only if limα→0(p2 − p1)
∗ > 0. The seller has an incentive to deliver the security
at the starting leg if and only if
(1− α)(p1 + y − p2 + v) + α(p1 + y − γ) ≥ −(p2 − p1) + v − c.
Hence, the cutoff value for the seller between failing and not failing at the starting leg
is
ȳ = −α(p2 − p1) + αγ − c.
This implies that the optimal fails charge is given by
c∗ = x− α(p2 − p1)
∗. (24)
The buyer’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh{(1− α)(−p1 + x+ p2) + α(−p1 + x+ v)}+ µl(p2 − p1 + c) = σπ.
From this, we obtain
p2 − p1 =
1
µh(1− α) + µl
(σπ − µhx− µlc). (25)
























which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10. We show that the optimal reset interest is strictly increasing
in α. The seller has an incentive to deliver the security at the starting leg if and only if
(1− α)(p1 + y − p2 + v) + α(p1 + y) ≥ −r + v.
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Hence, the cutoff value for the seller between failing and not failing at the starting leg
is
ȳ = (1− α)(p2 − p1)− r.
This implies that the optimal reset interest is such that
x = r∗ − (1− α)(p2 − p1)
∗ + αγ. (26)
The buyer’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh{(1− α)(−p1 + x+ p2) + α(−p1 + x+ v)}+ µlr = σπ.
From this, we obtain
p2 − p1 =
1
µh(1− α)
(σπ − µhx− µlr) . (27)
From (26) and (27), we obtain
r∗ =
yh + x− αγ
2(yh − yl)
{σ(yh + x)− (2 + σ)αγ} .









which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11. We show that ȳ∗1 = −x1 at the social optimum. The buyer’s
proportional bargaining is given by
µh(−p1 + x1 + x2 + p3) + µl(−p1 + x2 + p3) = σπ.
The seller’s proportional bargaining is given by
µh(p1 + ỹ
e
1 + y2 − p3 + v) + µl(p1 + y2 − p3 + v)− v = (1− σ)π.
The zero profit condition of sellers is given by
η(θ) [µh(p1 + ỹ
e
1 + y2 − p3 + v) + µl(p1 + y2 − p3 + v)] + [1− η(θ)] v − v = k.
35
The social welfare is given by
W = ζ(θ) [µh(−p1 + x1 + x2 + p3) + µl(−p1 + x2 + p3)] .
In the same way that we obtain the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain the same










+ x2 + y2.
Hence, we obtain ȳ∗ = −x1.
Proof of Proposition 12. We derive only the cutoff ȳ1. The seller has an incentive to
deliver the security at the starting leg if and only if
p1 + y1 + y2 − p3 + v ≥ max{p1 + y2 − p3 + v − c,−(p3 − p1) + v − c}.
From this, we obtain
ȳ1 = −c,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13. We derive only the cutoff ȳ1. The seller has an incentive to
deliver the security at the starting leg if and only if
p1 + y1 + y2 − p3 + v ≥ max{y2 − r + v,−r + v}.
From this, we obtain
ȳ1 = −r + (p3 − p1),
which completes the proof.
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